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When a person gets convicted of a drunk driving (DUI or DWI) charge in a state other than Maryland, that state usually sends a notice of the conviction to the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA). The MVA is then authorized to take action against the person’s driver’s license under a number of provisions.

Artilce IV of the Driver License Compact, allows Maryland to take action against the person’s driver’s license as follows:

Effect of Conviction

(a) The licensing authority in the home state, for the purposes of suspension, revocation or limitation of the license to operate a motor vehicle, shall give the same effect to the conduct reported, pursuant to Article III of this Compact, as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state, in the case of convictions for:
(1) Manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle;
(2) Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug, or under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle;
(3) Any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used;
(4) Failure to stop and render aid in the event of a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another.
(b) As to any other convictions, reported pursuant to Article III, the licensing authority in the home state shall record the conviction on the individual’s driving record, but may not assess points for the conviction.

Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 16-703.

If a person receives 12 points within a two year period, and DUI carries 12 points, the MVA may revoke the person’s driver’s license. In addition, the driver may have his or her license revoked or suspended under Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 16-206(a)(1)(v) which provides that a driver may be revoked or suspended if the person “[h]as committed an offense in another state that, if committed in this State, would be grounds for suspension or revocation.”

The Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) who decide these cases have an enormous amount of discretion in deciding what sanction to impose. The ALJ can impose a sanction ranging from revocation to a reprimand (warning) and everything in between. This can include a restricted license for a month or two allowing only driving related to work, education, alcohol education, and medical purposes for the driver and family members. The ALJ may also impose a restriction requiring the driver to enroll in and successfully complete the Maryland Ignition Interlock System Program. Typically the driver presents mitigation evidence in the form of certificates of completion from alcohol education and treatment classes, and letters from an employer verifying a need for work related driving.
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The National College for DUI Defense (NCDD) and the Maryland Criminal Defense Attorneys’ Association (MCDAA) filed an amicus brief late last month authored by attorney Leonard R. Stamm in Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) v. Deering.

Deering was arrested for DUI and requested to take a breath test. Before submitting she asked to call her lawyer. However, the police department had a policy of not allowing arrestees to call their lawyers before submitting to a breath test. The policy directly contradicts the Court of Appeals‘ holding in Sites v. State that a person accused of drunk driving has a right to contact a lawyer so long as the phone call does not interfere with the State’s ability to conduct the test. Deering submitted to the test and blew a 0.16 At her license suspension hearing for a test of 0.15 or greater her attorney asked the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to take “no action” due to the failure to allow her to call her lawyer. The ALJ denied the motion, but was reversed by the circuit court on appeal. The MVA asked the Court of Appeals to hear the case and they agreed to.

The issue in the case is whether denial of counsel can be raised as a defense at an administrative license suspension hearing. The amicus brief raises 6 points.

1. The considerations governing the choice of submitting to or refusing an alcohol test are much more complex now than when Sites was decided in 1984, the consequences of a wrong choice more severe, and the need for counsel greater.

2. The due process right to contact counsel was recognized by this court in Sites primarily due to a potential loss of the ability to earn a livelihood, and the MVA hearing is the only forum where loss of employment or inability to obtain employment can meaningfully be addressed

3. Addressing due process concerns, the legislature amended § 16-205.1(f) to include a requirement that the officer “fully advise” the driver of the administrative sanctions for failing and for refusing the test

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Annie Dookhan, a former forensic chemist at a state forensic laboratory in Massachusetts, pleaded guilty to 27 counts of falsifying test results, misleading investigators, and tampering with evidence. She was sentenced this week to 3-5 years in prison. followed by 2 years of probation. In the course of her career she filed reports in approximately 40,000 criminal cases, which are now under review.

This is an extreme case, but it highlights the need for defense lawyers to carefully scrutinize state police laboratory results and methods to uncover mistakes resulting from incompetence, negligence, and fraud in criminal cases. Newpaper stories are replete with cases of laboratory mistakes that have resulted in erroneous convictions.

The amicus brief filed by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the National College for DUI defense in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, co-written by Leonard R. Stamm said:

“Forensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation.” Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536. The recent report by the National Research Council of the National Academies, Strengthening Forensic Sciences in the United States: a Path Forward (2009) (NAS Report), confirmed what defense lawyers have long known: because forensic analysis is a product of human discretion, it is vulnerable to incompetence, error and sometimes even fraud. See also Solomon Moore, Science Found Wanting in Nation’s Crime Labs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/us/05forensics.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2010). As the NAS Report revealed, forensic analyses “are often handled by poorly trained technicians who then exaggerate the accuracy of their methods in court.” Id. The NAS Report verifies that forensic science is anything but infallible, and is instead fraught by very human errors leading to problems such as sample contamination and inaccurate reports. Id.

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The United States District Court for the Southern Division of Maryland in Greenbelt issued its first ruling Friday granting a defense motion to suppress a warrantless blood test as a result of the Supreme Court decision in Missouri v. McNeely. Magistrate Judge Thomas M. DiGirolamo issued a 19 page written opinion holding that McNeely applied to cases pending at the time of its issuance, that the Government did not demostrate sufficient exigent circumstances to justify dispensing with a warrant, and that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule did apply in the case of United States v. Brown, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147352 (D. Md. October 11, 2013).

The opinion stated:

The government asserts that this case falls within the exigent circumstances exception. Specifically, it points to the 30 minute delay in the taking of the defendant’s blood due to the defendant’s failure to cooperate with the breath test at the station. The Court does not find that said delay combined with the natural dissipation of blood-alcohol brings this case within the exigent circumstances exception. This is simply not a case where the exigencies of the situation were so compelling to excuse the need for a warrant. Officer Weisbaum described this incident as a “routine” DWI stop. While this alone does not mean a warrant is required, it is a “special fact” to be considered. See McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1568. Additionally, unlike Schmerber, time did not have to be taken to investigate an accident or attend to the suspect’s personal injuries. There was nothing about the defendant’s physical or mental condition, or behavior, which required the expenditure of time in addition to what would normally be expended in a routine DWI stop. Officer Weisbaum testified that it is common for defendants to at first agree to cooperate with the breath test and then not blow sufficiently, resulting in a failed test. The Court does not find that the totality of the circumstances present in this case constitute such an emergency to excuse the officer from obtaining a warrant prior to the taking of the defendant’s blood. Given that the defendant did not consent to the blood test, the Court finds the taking of his blood was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

There remain pending in Greenbelt a number of unresolved motions to suppress due to the policy of the U.S. Park Police to obtain blood samples in DUI cases without first seeking a warrant prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. McNeely, on April 17, 2013. The U.S. Park Police was one of a very small number of jurisdictions in the United States that followed the practice of getting blood samples from DUI suspects without first getting a warrant. The vast majority of states that obtained blood samples were already seeking and getting judicially issued warrants before drawing blood in DUI cases.
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Electronic signs all over Maryland are telling drivers about the new laws that kicked in today. What exactly is going on? Two offenses that were previously denominated as secondary actions have been changed to primary actions.

As the 90 day legislative report states:

Senate Bill 339/House Bill 753 (both passed) authorize primary enforcement of the prohibitions against the use of (1) a wireless communication device by a minor operating a motor vehicle; (2) a handheld telephone by an adult driver while operating a motor vehicle with a provisional license or learner’s permit; (3) a handheld telephone by an operator of a school vehicle that is carrying passengers and in motion; and (4) the fully licensed driver’s hands to use a handheld telephone, while the vehicle is in motion, except as specified. The bills repeal the provisions of law that limited enforcement to a secondary action when a driver is detained for another violation.

What this means is that previously a police officer could not stop a vehicle if he or she observed the listed violations. A person could only be charged under one of these provisions if the person was first stopped for a different violation. This law now allows officers to stop a vehicle based on observation of one of these violations alone.
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Last year, the Maryland legislature changed the law that required the court to send trial notices to all persons receiving traffic tickets. Now a person receiving a payable (minor) traffic violation and no jailable (non-payable – must appear) companion tickets must either pay the ticket or request a trial within 30 days. If this is not done the driver’s license is suspended until they pay it.

The ticket says:

IF ANY OF YOUR VIOLATIONS ARE MARKED “MUST APPEAR”: You will automatically be mailed a notice of your trial date by
the Court. Failure to appear will result in a warrant for your arrest.

Then further down on the form it says:

IF ANY OF YOUR VIOLATIONS ARE MARKED “PAYABLE FINE”: You must comply with one of the following within 30 days
after receipt of the citation. Provide any change of address if applicable.
OPTION #1 – PAYMENT: Pay the full amount of the fine for each violation within 30 days at any District Court of Maryland, by
mail, or by credit card (fees apply) using the IVR system or the Court Website. If paying by mail, make check or money order
payable to District Court of MD and include citation number(s) on front of check or money order. On the option form below, check
“Pay Fine Amount” for each violation being paid and mail the form with your payment to the address shown for the District Court of
MD.
An additional $10 service fee will be imposed for each dishonored check.
OPTION #2 – REQUEST A WAIVER HEARING REGARDING SENTENCING AND DISPOSITION INSTEAD OF A TRIAL: On the
option form below, check “Request Waiver Hearing” for each violation where hearing is requested, sign and date at bottom and mail the
form within 30 days to the address shown below. DO NOT SEND PAYMENT at this time.
OPTION #3 – REQUEST TRIAL: On the option form below, check “Request Trial” for each violation where Trial is requested, sign, date
at bottom and mail the form within 30 days to the address shown below. DO NOT SEND PAYMENT at this time.

The problem occurs when the person (or their parent!) pays the citation without knowing the consequences. First of all, if any of the tickets is a must appear, then it should absolutely not be paid because a trial date will be scheduled for all the tickets together. The notice on the citation is not clear about this! Even if none of the tickets is a must appear, no ticket should be paid before the person knows everything that will happen at the MVA. And in most cases, people receiving tickets do better by going to court anyway.
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On May 1, 2013, Leonard Stamm was given the first annual Fred Bennett Zealous Advocacy Award by the Maryland Criminal Defense Attorney’s Association (MCDAA). This award will be given annually to the member of MCDAA who best exemplifies the qualities that Fred Warren Bennett possessed which made him a courageous litigator and tireless advocate for criminally accused individuals.

Fred Warren Bennett was the former Federal Defender for Maryland (1980-1992), the Prince George=s County Public Defender (1978-1980), and a full-time Law Professor at Catholic University (1992-1997) before entering private practice in 1998. Among his many high profile clients were accused spies Ronald Pelton and John Walker and several men he represented after they had received death sentences. Fred was an expert on evidence, federal trial practice, and capital defense litigation. He won numerous awards, authored over 30 law related articles and lectured at many Maryland and national criminal defense seminars and was a mentor to a host of prominent Maryland criminal defense lawyers. Fred was incredibly forthright, a character, an incredibly zealous advocate, and a true legend in the Maryland criminal defense bar. Fred Bennett unexpectedly passed away on July 1, 2007.

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The Supreme Court today announced its opinion in Missouri v. McNeely and ruled that police in DUI investigations may not automatically avoid seeking a search warrant to obtain a blood sample where the defendant does not consent to a blood test. This is the third win as amicus curiae for the National College for DUI Defense which filed an amicus brief with the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

The Court said:

In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948) (“We cannot . . . excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made [the search] imperative”).

It is interesting counting the votes again.

With respect to the proposition that there is no per se DUI exception to the warrant requirement in so far as non-consensual blood tests are concerned, the vote is 8-1 (only Thomas dissented from the holding). Since that was the only basis urged by Missouri for decision, the Missouri Supreme Court was affirmed. Missouri never appealed the question of whether the officer in this case acted reasonably.

As a result, Justice Kennedy wouldn’t touch when and whether it might be reasonable for an officer to get blood without a warrant. He is willing to wait for the next case to do so. In so far as there was a discussion about how to determine when and whether an exigency exists there were 3 votes for kind of a special totality test where if the warrant couldn’t be obtained without any delay at all, then it might not be needed (Roberts, Alito & Breyer). But Sotomayor, Kagan, Scalia and Ginsburg disagreed with this approach.
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This past Thursday and Friday the National College for DUI Defense held its annual winter session in Scottsdale, Arizona. On Thursday, the seminar featured presentations by Robert Hirshhorn on Voir Dire Gems in DWI Cases, Leonard R. Stamm on The Top 20 Guidelines for Bench Trials, Mimi Coffey on Cross Examination (SFSTs) of the Arresting Officer, Virginia Landry on Cross Examination of the Arresting Officer (nonSFSTs), Josh Lee on Blood Testing – G.C. Theory and Issue Spotting, Phil Price on Breath Testing the Twelve Step Approach, Jess Paul on Retrograde Extrapolation, and Ron Moore on Drug Toxicology Strategies & Issues. On Friday, attendees heard from Doug Murphy with a voir dire demonstration, Ava George Stewart with a demonstration of Cross-Examination of the Arresting Officer (SFSTs), Bruce Edge with a demonstration of Cross-Examination of the Arresting Officer (nonSFSTs), Tim Huey with a demonstration of Cross-Examination of the Toxicologist on Retrograde Extrapolation, Michael Hawkins with a demonstration of Cross-Examination of the Breath Test Technician, and Jim Nesci and Joe St. Louis with a demonstration of Cross-Examination of the Blood Test Technician.
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Today, the Supreme Court heard argument in the case of Missouri v. McNeely. The case involved police obtaining a blood alcohol test without a warrant. The officer, who had previously had no difficulty obtaining warrants before getting blood samples in DUI cases had mistakenly believed that Missouri law had changed. Because there was nothing unusual about the case, the Missouri Supreme Court distinguished the 1966 Supreme Court case of Schmerber v. California, where due to the delay occasioned by an accident investigation and the defendant’s trip to a hospital, and the dissipation of alcohol in the blood, the Supreme Court allowed a warrantless blood draw. In this case, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the state had failed to show the special circumstances that would have allowed police to skip getting a warrant.

The State of Missouri requested review, posing the following question:

Whether a law enforcement officer may obtain a nonconsensual and warrantless blood sample from a drunk driver under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement based upon the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream

McNeely was represented in the Supreme Court by Steven Shapiro, legal director of the ACLU. McNeely was supported by a number of amicus briefs, including one filed by the National College for DUI Defense and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and co-authored by Leonard R. Stamm, Jeffrey Green, and Jeffrey Beelaert.
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